Good News for Dave Hardy

Dave just won a First Amendment case invalidating part of the Arizona Constitution.   Good deal!  You want my opinion, the whole primary system stinks.  I don’t think political parties should be able to hijack the voting apparatus of the state for selecting candidates, or  the other way around.  That’s just bad public policy.

But I think open primaries tread on the First Amendment’s freedoms of association.  If you’re going to let the state hijack the selection of candidates for parties, you should have to choose a party association.

Personally, I think all the states should do it the Iowa way, with caucuses.  All that stuff should happen outside the structure of the state.  There are ways you can structure ballot rules to be fair to the major parties, and to third parties, without letting every yahoo group onto the ballot.

A Bit on Section 302 of MHPA

I notice Larry Pratt keeps bringing up a Pennsylvania case where a man was committed involuntarily for observation under Section 302 of Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedures Act. This provision is described as follows:

Section 302 is the part of the Act relating to treatment without consent for observed behavior constituting a clear and present danger to the individual and/or others. The behavior must have occurred in the past 30 days. Under Section 302(a) any responsible party can petition for an involuntary evaluation by stating that an individual may be severely mentally disabled.

Now, it should be noted that for purposes of a federal firearms disability, this section is insufficient. The regulations specifically exempt persons held for observation.

Committed to a mental institution. A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority. The term includes a commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term includes commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. It also includes commitments for other reasons, such as for drug use. The term does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.

But that’s federal. The PA Uniform Firearms Act is also a controlling law:

A person who has been adjudicated as an incompetent or who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under section 302, 303 or 304 of the provisions of the act of July 9, 1976 (P.L.817, No.143), known as the Mental Health Procedures Act. This paragraph shall not apply to any proceeding under section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act unless the examining physician has issued a certification that inpatient care was necessary or that the person was committable.

So unless the person actually ends up being involuntarily committed to a mental health institution, there’s no prohibition under federal or state law that prevents him from owning a firearm in the future, unless he’s committed.  It should be noted that Pennsylvania already has a mechanism in place for restoration of rights for commitments and adjudications.  In the editorial I mentioned last, a PA district attorney was quoted as saying:

“I contacted the sheriff and had his license to carry a firearm revoked. And I asked police to commit him under Section 302 of the mental health procedures act and that was done. He is now ineligible to possess firearms [for life] because he was committed involuntarily,” the district attorney reported.

I think that particular DA needs to read the law, because he’s wrong.

Uniform Firearms Act: Act 68 – Firearms in Vehicles

This latest in my series on the history of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Firearms Act comes to us from Dec. 7, 1989, P.L.607, No.68, or Act 68 of 1989. This act is what made it a crime to carry a rifle or a shotgun in a vehicle:

§ 6106.1. Carrying loaded weapons other than firearms.

(a) General rule.–No person shall carry a loaded pistol, revolver, shotgun or rifle, other than a firearm as defined in section 6102 (relating to definitions), in any vehicle. The provisions of this subsection SECTION shall not apply to persons excepted from the requirement of a license to carry firearms under section 6106(b)(1), (2), (5) or (6) (relating to firearms not to be carried without a license) NOR SHALL THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION BE CONSTRUED TO PERMIT PERSONS TO CARRY FIREARMS IN A VEHICLE WHERE SUCH CONDUCT IS PROHIBITED BY SECTION 6106.

(b) Penalty.–A person who violates the provisions of this section commits a summary offense.

This is where Pennsylvania law starts to get a bit screwy. A firearm is defined in the UFA as any pistol, revolver, or rifle with a barrel less than 16″ in length, or a shotgun less than 18″ in length, or with an overall length less than 26″ in length. Anything within that can be carried loaded in a vehicle if you have a license to carry firearms, which by this time was issued on a shall issue basis, except for in Philadelphia. Anything outside of that definition, may not be carried loaded in a vehicle, even if you have a license. The exceptions are only for police, military and a few others.

Uniform Firearms Act: Act 158 – Right to Carry

We will start this continuing series with Pennsylvania going from a “may-issue” discretionary issue state, to a shall-issue state. Prior to Act 158, the law read something like this:

Issue of License.–The Chief or Head of any police fore or department of a city, and elsewhere the Sheriff of a County, may, upon the application of any person, issue a license to such person to carry a firearm in a vehicle or concealed on or about his person within this commonwealth for not more than five years from the date of issue, if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear an injury to his person or property, or has any other proper reason for carrying a firearm, and that he is a suitable person to be licensed.

Act 158 was actually a child welfare bill, that had right to carry attached to it. It fundamentally altered the licensing language to say:

Grant or Denial of License.–Upon the receipt of an application for the license to carry a firearm, the sheriff shall, within 45 days, issue or refuse to issue a license on the basis of the investigation under subsection (d) and the accuracy of the information contained in the application. If the sheriff refuses to issue a license, the sheriff shall notify the applicant in writing of the refusal and the reason. The notice shall be sent by certified mail to the applicant at the address set fourth in the application.

This basically made the state shall issue.  Subsection D spells out the conditions that one must meet to qualify for a license, and they are objective, for the most part.   But, there was a catch:

 (2) In a City of the First Class, a license shall be issued only if it additionally appears that the applicant ahs good reason to fear an injury to the applicant’s person or property, or has any other proper reason for carrying a firearm and that the applicant is a suitable individual to be licensed.

Philadelphia is the only city of the first class in the Commonwealth.  Act 158 specifically exempted Philadelphia from the right-to-carry requirement, and allowed the city to continue to refuse to issue gun licenses to anyone they didn’t sufficiently like.

Act 158 also made provision for sportsman’s permits, for carrying a firearm while hunting, in addition to strengthening the state’s preemption to include ammunition and ammunition components.

A Legislative History: Uniform Firearms Act

I noticed there’s no good summary out there on the legislative history of Pennsylvania’s Uniforms Firearms Act, which is the section of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes that relate to firearms. I thought it would be worthwhile to go through and offer a legislative history of this act from the passage of right-to-carry in 1988 to the present time. I’ll keep updating this post with links to further posts. For the sake of brevity, I will only cover the major revisions to the UFA, and not the more minor ones.

Part 1: Act 158 of 1988 – Right to Carry
Part 2: Act 68 of 1989 – Firearms in Vehicles

Armor Piercing Ammo

The regulations on armor piercing ammo are among the strangest of the federal firearms regulations. The first is that AP ammo is rather odd in its definition. The ATF defines it as handgun ammunition, but there’s a catch. If any handgun has ever been made in a specific caliber, then ATF considers that the AP ammo regulations then apply to that caliber. That’s why you can’t buy AP ammo for cartridges like 7.62×39 and several others. The 5.56x45NATO is specifically exempted from this, even though there are pistols made for it.

It’s perfectly legal to possess, purchase, sell or shoot armor piercing ammunition. It’s not legal to manufacture or import armor piercing ammunition.

In order to manufacture AP rounds, you have to hold a type 10 FFL (18 USC sec. 922(a)(7)). In order to import AP rounds, you have to hold a type 11 FFL (18 USC sec. 922(a)(7)). If you hold either one of these FFLs, it’s not legal to sell or export AP rounds, except to military, law enforcement (18 USC sec. 922(a)(8)). In addition, if you hold a type 06-08 FFL (manufactures of firearms, importers of firearms, manufactures of ammunition), then you also my not sell AP rounds to the general public.

For regular type 01-03 FFL holders, you may sell or deliver AP ammunition, but it must be entered into the Acquisition and Disposition Record (bound book). So if you have any AP rounds in your possession, that’s ok. But it’s been illegal to manufacture or import new ammunition that’s transferable to ordinary citizens for quite some time, and for the most part, it’s generally unavailable, and certainly not in any significant quantity for most calibers.

Of course, there are also various state restrictions. Pennsylvania prohibits KTW ammunition. NJ and NY have additional restrictions on AP ammo.

Strawman Purchase: The Gory Details

Reading some of the comments over at SayUncle’s, I thought it would be useful to talk about the actual statute that is currently responsible for Steve Bailey troubles with the feds:

(a) It shall be unlawful —

(6) for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any firearm or ammunition from a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification, intended or likely to deceive such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm or ammunition under the provisions of this chapter

So straw purchasing basically rests on the fact that it’s considered to be a conspiracy to provide false identification and to deceive the dealer as to the lawfulness of a firearm purchase.

Is Steve Bailey guilty of facilitating a straw purchase? If the security guard remained in possession of the revolver after it was purchased, and it was purchased, with the understanding among the party, that he was the actual buyer, and he would keep the firearm, then it would be difficult for the feds to argue that the buyer made a false statement, and that a straw purchase took place.  He was the actual buyer.

If Bailey at any point took constructive possession of the firearm, then he would indeed be guilty of facilitating a straw purchase. But constructive possession is different than actual possession. He may have held the gun at some point, but this is not unlawful; you can go shooting with someone out of state and use their firearms, even though you might have actual possession, but it’s your friend’s property.   There is one thing about this that’s interesting:

Constructive possession is the power and intent of an individual to control a particular item, even though it is not physically in that person’s control. For example, an individual who has the key to a bank safe-deposit box, which contains a piece of jewelry that she owns, is said to be in constructive possession of the jewelry.

So, even if Bailey didn’t keep the firearm, if it was understood among the party that it was “his”, and he retained access to it, he’s admitted to paying for it, that could be construed as a straw purchase of a firearm, even if it never made it’s way back to Massachusetts with Bailey. The New Hampshire security guard was not the actual buyer, and Bailey, as a resident of Massachusetts, is prohibited by federal law from purchasing a firearm in New Hampshire.

Consider what the 9th Circuit had to say about straw purchasing in US v. Moore:

The straw man doctrine, which is nothing more than a long-standing construction of the relevant statutes, holds that a person violates section 922(a)(6) by acting as an intermediary or agent of someone who is ineligible to obtain a firearm from a licensed dealer and making a false statement that enables the ineligible principal to obtain a firearm. As we said in Perri v. Department of the Treasury, 637 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981), “sham or `strawman’ ” purchases occur “when a lawful purchaser buys for an unlawful one.” See United States v. Lawrence, 680 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1982) (defendants who purchase firearms for ineligible foreign citizens violate section 922(a)(6)); United States v. Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir. 1985) (same). In Lawrence, for example, the Sixth Circuit found determinative of straw man status that, like Wiley, the transferee (1) acted under the direction and control of the ineligible buyer, (2) purchased weapons selected by the ineligible buyer with the buyer’s money, (3) took a commission that showed agency, and (4) had no intention of keeping the gun for himself.

I would imagine the ATF is eager to find out two things.  1) Whether the New Hampshire security guard is in possession of the firearm, indicating that he was the actual buyer, and 2) whether there was any understanding among the parties to the purchase that it was going to be Bailey’s gun.

If the feds decided to prosecute based on the latter, I think it would be unique in the federal court system, since I’ve not found any case similar to it, but it seems like a plausible premise.  Think about a girlfriend who buys a firearm for her drug dealing felon boyfriend, but retains actual possession of it.  He can still come over and use it any time he wanted to, because he gave her the money, and it’s understood to be his firearm.  Would this not be a straw purchase?  I would imagine the feds would want to argue that it is.

Given the scrutiny he’s receiving from the feds, I sincerely hope that Steve Bailey will think twice about supporting this minefield of federal and state regulations that ordinary, law abiding gun owners are forced to navigate in order to exercise their constitutional right.  Many of these laws can easily, easily trap people with no criminal intent.   Maybe these folks want it to be risky and legally hazardous to purchase and own guns, but if that’s the case, they should plainly say so.  They should stop trying to sell the public on the idea that they want to control crime, and admit to desiring to make criminals out of otherwise law abiding people who participate in activities they find socially distasteful.

Duty to Retreat for Non-Lethal Force?

Eugene Volokh discusses the possibility, in a case coming out of Iowa here. Go have a read. I can’t believe the guy opted for a bench trial. I would imagine juries are a lot more sympathetic to a defendant in a situation like this, especially a police officer, and would be a lot more willing to overlook a duty to retreat.